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FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY





Graham and Maitzen think my CORNEA principle is in trouble because it
entails “intolerable violations of closure under known entailment.” I argue 
that the trouble arises from current befuddlement about closure itself, and 
that a distinction drawn by Rudolph Carnap, suitably extended, shows 
how closure, when properly understood, works in tandem with CORNEA.
CORNEA does not obey Closure because it shouldn’t: it applies to “dynamic” 
epistemic operators, whereas closure principles hold only for “static” ones. 
What the authors see as an intolerable vice of CORNEA is actually a virtue, 
helping us see what closure principles should—and shouldn’t—themselves 
be about.
Over the years, CORNEA—my “Condition of ReasoNable Epistemic Ac-
cess”—has gott en a mixed reception. Graham and Maitzen1 (hereaft er “the 
authors”) fi nd CORNEA in deep trouble: it entails, they think, “intolerable 
violations of closure under known entailment” (hereaft er just “Closure”). 
I agree that CORNEA doesn’t obey Closure. But I don’t agree that this is 
trouble for CORNEA, and welcome this chance to say why.2
Though the authors don’t mention it, Closure has itself been under a 
cloud of befuddlement since the mid-1970s.3 John Hawthorne notes that 
many now embrace “the idea that no version of the closure principle 
is true”—to the dismay of others like Richard Feldman, who fi nds this 
“among the least plausible ideas to gain currency in epistemology in re-
cent years.”4 In large part, the cloud over Closure arises because, as many 
see it, unpalatable skeptical consequences follow from Closure combined 
with other principles that are judged even more compelling than Closure. 
And chief among these other principles, we will see, is a version of what I 
have called CORNEA.
In saying this, my aim isn’t to shift  the trouble from CORNEA to
Closure. I’m a fan of Closure, and want to help both CORNEA and Clo-
sure stay out of trouble. To do this, I want here to extend a distinction 
made by Rudolph Carnap. The “Carnapian Distinction,” as I’ll call it, was 
built into CORNEA from the outset, but its relevance to Closure seems to 
me underappreciated. I begin, in sections 1 through 3, by giving a wid-
er view of CORNEA, Closure, and their apparent troubles. In sections 
4 through 7, I explain Carnap’s distinction and show how extending it 
helps relieve these troubles. Section 8 locates two key errors in the au-
thors’ critique of CORNEA.
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1. What CORNEA Says: A Wider View
CORNEA emerged in response to William Rowe’s inductive arguments 
from evil. Rowe begins from suﬀ erings for which we see no good suﬃ  cient 
to justify the theistic God in allowing this suﬀ ering; Rowe then urges that 
such data—our seeing no such good for select suﬀ erings—is5 strong induc-
tive support for there being no such good (and hence, by a short further 
step, for there being no God). Initially, Rowe put this in the appears-idiom: 
by virtue of our seeing no good for the suﬀ erings, he said, “it appears that 
there is no such good.” CORNEA thus was also initially put in the appears-
idiom. Later Rowe morphed to a probabilistic idiom; CORNEA morphed 
to keep up. The authors focus on CORNEA in its appears-version, but the 
same issues arise for later versions.
On all versions, the key idea behind CORNEA is a proposed test for 
whether some alleged evidence E seriously “supports”—in a sense to be 
clarifi ed presently—some hypothesis H. The test is this: ask whether, if H 
were false, E is still prett y much what one should expect. If the answer is 
“Yes,” then E can’t seriously support H. For example, let H be the hypoth-
esis that there are no HIV viruses on a specifi c hypodermic needle about 
to go into your arm, and let E be the datum that on close visual inspection, 
the doctor sees no such viruses on the needle. Does his seeing no such 
viruses seriously support the claim that there are none? Using the test, 
we ask: “if H were false (if there were viruses present), is E (your seeing 
none) still prett y much expectable?” The answer is “Yes”; the idea behind 
CORNEA is that E can’t then seriously support H. And here this result 
seems just right.
This requirement on the supports-relation is the key idea behind
CORNEA. But CORNEA itself proposes a higher-level test-condition—a 
requirement on rational (justifi ed, entitled) claims about the supports-
relation. The condition is this: for some human H (Henry, let’s say) to be
entitled6 to claim that new evidence E seriously supports H, it must be 
reasonable for Henry to believe (should he consider the matt er) that the 
answer to the test question is “No.” Let’s put this in the epistemic“ ap-
pears” idiom (as Rowe initially put his case). Suppose the doctor inspects 
the needle and sees no HIV viruses. Is he, on the basis of this cognitive 
situation, entitled to say “It appears that there are no HIV viruses on this 
needle”? CORNEA says he is entitled to say this only if the following 
condition is met: that it is reasonable for him to believe, given what he 
has to go on, that if the italicized claim were false (i.e., if there were HIV 
viruses on the needle), his visual data would be diﬀ erent (with respect 
to the no-see feature) than it is. For a normal doctor this condition is of 
course not met, so the doctor isn’t entitled to the make the appears-claim. 
Again this result seems just right, and generalizing it gives CORNEA in 
its oﬃ  cial 1984 formulation:7
On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim 
“It appears that p” only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, 
given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p 
were not the case, s would likely be diﬀ erent8 than it is in some way 
discernible by her.
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It is, as we will see, this 1984 version that the authors indict for “intoler-
able violations of closure.” But their indictment will apply equally (well or 
not) to later versions as well.
2. Trouble in CORNEA-land
What the authors call “the principle of closure under known entailment” 
is, as I see it, not so much one principle as a family of principles. Like 
CORNEA, these too spring from a core intuition: if you are to a certain de-
gree “epistemically well-oﬀ ” with respect to p, and you see that p entails 
q, then you are at least equally well-oﬀ  with respect to q. Here there are 
a family of epistemic operators covering aspects of being “epistemically 
well-oﬀ .” Lett ing “knows*” represent this family of operators, closure 
principles thus take roughly9 the following form:
If Sam knows* that p, and Sam knows that p entails q, then it is also 
the case that Sam knows* that q.
To bring CORNEA into confl ict with Closure, the authors use a brain-in-
vat scenario. I will simplify it a bit. Suppose you’ve stayed up late worry-
ing that you might be a brain in a vat. You fi nally get to sleep, but wake 
up before dawn still worrying. A glance shows your bedside alarm clock 
reading “5:59 A.M.”—one minute before you set it to ring. You presently 
hear a ringing sound, and so have the new evidential input E:
(E) I am experiencing the familiar sound of my alarm clock ringing.
Now this seems to support the hypothesis
(R) The alarm clock next to my bed is ringing
and CORNEA nicely allows this: aft er all, if the alarm next to your bed 
were not ringing, it’s not expectable that you’d be experiencing that famil-
iar ringing sound. The trouble arises because, despite your worries, you 
also believe:
(~BIV) I’m not an envatt ed brain wired to a super-sophisticated com-
puter that simulates exactly this familiar ringing sound (along 
with the rest of my experience of the virtual day to follow).
Here it is crucial to see that BIV is not just a general brain-in-vat hypoth-
esis. It is very specifi c: your envatt ed brain is connected to a computer that 
simulates the exact phenomenal reality of your alarm clock ringing (and the 
rest of your day). Let’s call this the Phat-Vat Hypothesis.10
As the authors see it, the Phat Vat hypothesis gets CORNEA in closure 
trouble on account of three claims. Claim 1 is that, as we have seen, R (in 
relation to E) passes the CORNEA test: CORNEA thus allows that E can11
seriously support R. Claim 2 is that ~BIV fl unks the CORNEA test, for if ~BIV 
were false (i.e., if you were a brain in the Phat Vat), your experience would not 
be diﬀ erent than it is. So CORNEA says that the experienced ringing cannot 
seriously support ~BIV.12 But—Claim 3—R obviously entails ~BIV (and you 
see that it does). This gives traction to Closure: if E supports R, it must also 
support ~BIV. CORNEA, the authors think, thus violates Closure.
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The violation looks especially egregious in the appears mode. For here 
CORNEA entails that you can be entitled to say “It appears that my alarm 
is ringing” even though you are not entitled to say “It appears that I am not 
a brain in the Phat Vat (hearing a merely virtual alarm).” But how could 
this be? How could you be entitled to claim that it appears (epistemically) 
that A, see that A entails13 B, and yet not be entitled to claim that it appears 
that B? Indeed, the authors urge that by CORNEA, you can sometimes be 
entitled to say “It appears that A&B”, see that A&B entails B, and yet not 
be entitled to say “It appears that B.”14 Deeming such closure-violations 
“intolerable,” they rhetorically ask:
How could your total evidence support a conjunction while failing to 
support one of its conjuncts? How could you be evidentially bett er-
oﬀ  with respect to (p & q) than you are with respect to p?
3. Trouble in Closure-land
But, as noted earlier, many these days see Closure itself as in trouble. The 
trouble has been spotlighted by the rise of contextualism, which seeks to 
exploit (and relieve) the pressure toward skepticism by scenarios of both 
the global brain-in-vat sort, and of a more local variety. Reviewing a local 
scenario will open the territory I want to explore.
Dretske’s well-known zebra case is as good as any. You are at the zoo in 
front of the zebra cage, looking at the striped equine therein. Common sense 
says that your visual data strongly supports, indeed allows you to know*:
(Z) The animal in front of me is a zebra.
But (Z) entails, as you see, that
(~PID) The animal is not a donkey cleverly painted in stripes to look 
like a zebra.
Now if Closure holds, then if on looking at the striped equine in the cage 
you know* Z, you also know* that ~PID. But does your visual data really 
allow you to know* that it’s not a painted-in-stripes donkey? Many deem 
Closure here in trouble, for they judge it is clear that your data doesn’t 
allow you to know this.15 It doesn’t, because “aft er all” (as Stewart Cohen 
puts it)16
[T]hat’s just how it would look if it were a cleverly disguised mule.
So in the judgment of many, the look of the striped equine doesn’t enable 
you to know* ~PID, because “that’s just how it would look if it were a clev-
erly disguised mule.” But if this is a principled judgment, the underlying 
principle is something like this: the data can’t enable you to know it’s not 
an X, if the data is just how it would look if it were an X. But this principle 
is, heaven help us, just a version of CORNEA. From a wider view, then, 
the trouble which the authors lay at CORNEA’s feet is just what leads 
many to abandon Closure (and what drives yet others into the arms of 
contextualism).
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4. The Carnapian Distinction
CORNEA , we’ve seen, is meant to test claims that some alleged evidence 
E (our seeing no HIV-viruses on the needle) provides serious “rational sup-
port” for some hypothesis H (there being no HIV viruses on the needle). But 
what does “rational support” mean here? In fi rst introducing CORNEA 
(and in later refi ning it), I distinguished between “weak” and “strong” 
senses of support, and then noted that both senses are “dynamic,” and to 
be separated from a “static” sense of the term:17
Both [strong and weak] senses of ‘disconfi rms’ [and confi rms] are 
dynamic, involving the degree to which the adduced evidence 
changes the likelihood of a claim from its likelihood on our back-
ground knowledge, and are thus to be distinguished from the ‘static’ 
sense (which Plantinga addresses) of the probability of a claim with 
respect to the adduced evidence alone.
This dynamic/static distinction was made by Rudolph Carnap within 
a probabilistic approach to inductive logic.18 Carnap observed that it is 
one thing for hypothesis H to be (statically) improbable on some body 
of evidence, and quite another thing for H to be rendered improbable 
by some new piece of evidence. Suppose that we are playing poker, that 
I am dealt a hand, and that I look at it and see that it contains no aces.19 
On my evidence, it is highly improbable that (H) you have four aces. 
In the static sense of “supports,” my evidence supports this H. But that 
you have four aces has not, by my new evidence (seeing I hold no aces),
become improbable or less probable. To the contrary, my seeing that I hold 
no aces raises the probability that you hold four aces: it renders this more 
likely than before. In the dynamic sense of supports (or confi rms), my 
new evidence supports H: it changes its probability, and does so in the 
“upwards” direction.
Using the same example, we can see that the same distinction applies, 
in a kind of analogical extension, to a whole range of epistemic operators. 
Consider the epistemic operator “justifi ed.” Let E be the evidential situa-
tion of my having seen my new hand containing no aces. I am, on my evi-
dence, justifi ed in believing that you do not hold four aces. But I have not, 
by seeing my hand, become (more) justifi ed in believing this about your 
hand. To the contrary, I have, by my new evidence, become somewhat less 
justifi ed than before in believing this.
The distinction also applies to epistemic appears-claims. I am, when 
in the cognitive situation of fi nding that I hold no aces, entitled to say 
“It appears that you are not holding four aces.” But I have not, by this 
fi nding (or on the basis of it), become (more) entitled to say “It appears 
that you are not holding four aces. That is, my degree of entitlement 
to this claim has not, by my new fi nding, been increased; indeed it has 
been decreased.
I shall refer to Carnap’s distinction, when extended in the above ways, 
as “the Carnapian Distinction.”
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5. Applying the Carnapian Distinction
In sections 2 and 3, we saw how the Phat Vat case seems to get not just 
CORNEA but also Closure in trouble. In that case, CORNEA says that E 
(your experiencing the ringing sound) can seriously support R (that you 
hear your real alarm clock ringing) but cannot seriously support ~BIV 
(that you are not in a Phat Vat). But you see that R clearly entails ~BIV, so 
Closure seems to require that if your experience supports R it also sup-
port ~BIV. The trouble, we saw, looks especially bad in the appears idiom,
allowing the authors to twist the knife:
How could your total evidence support a conjunction while failing 
to support one of its conjuncts? How could you be evidentially bet-
ter-oﬀ  with respect to (p & q) than you are with respect to p?
But the Carnapian Distinction uncovers equivocation here. What
CORNEA says is that E can’t support ~BIV in the dynamic sense (though 
it may support R). It says that by my new evidence, I may become justifi ed 
in believing R, but cannot become justifi ed in believing ~BIV. The crucial 
question is whether Closure applies to dynamic epistemic operators. The 
correct answer is that they do not. To see this consider a conjunction like 
(G&M): Graham is a citizen of a North American nation and Maitzen 
is a citizen of Borneo (picking this country at random). Suppose I am 
at present now nowhere near being justifi ed in believing G&M. I then 
meet Maitzen at the Central Division APA, and he assures me that he is 
from Borneo, showing me his Borneo passport. My new evidence E, by 
boosting M, may hugely boost the probability (justifi edness, etc.) of the 
conjunction G&M; yet it does nothing to boost the probability of G, the 
fi rst conjunct.20
My thesis, then, is that Closure doesn’t hold for dynamic “supports”; 
it pertains to static senses only.21 It says that if you see that R entails ~BIV, 
then it is not possible for you, on some specifi ed body of evidence, to be 
(statically) justifi ed in believing R, and also to be unjustifi ed in believing 
~BIV. Closure and CORNEA thus pertain to diﬀ erent things. Returning 
now to the trouble-making counterexamples, let us see in more detail 
whether, when Closure is properly Carnapped, the trouble is reduced.
6. Lett ing the Donkey Out of the Cage
Current contextualist theories get much appeal from their oﬀ er to explain 
our confl icting intuitions about local skeptical paradoxes of the “painted 
donkey” sort. It is interest, therefore, whether these paradoxes get some 
of their grip from neglecting the Carnap Distinction. To see how they 
might, let’s fi rst generate the paradox in a deliberately confl ationary 
“when seeing” locution:
When seeing the striped critt er in the cage, I am justifi ed in believ-
ing I see a zebra. That I see a zebra self—evidently entails that I am 
not seeing a cleverly painted-in-stripes donkey (~PID), so I must 
(by closure) be justifi ed in believing it too. But how, when seeing 
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the zebra-looking critt er, can I be justifi ed in believing that I’m not 
seeing a cleverly painted donkey? Aft er all, this is just how things 
would look if it were a cleverly-painted donkey.
Here the locution “when seeing” deliberately obscures the distinction 
between saying “On observing O, I am justifi ed in believing B” and say-
ing “By observing O, I become justifi ed in believing B.” We are then 
immediately torn between an intuition grounded on Closure and one 
grounded on CORNEA. The Carnapian Distinction allows us to describe 
the situation more discerningly in terms of two complementary truths, 
T1 and T2:
It is true that (T1) by seeing the striped critt er in the cage, I can 
become justifi ed in believing that (Z) I see a zebra, even though, by 
seeing this, I cannot become justifi ed in believing it is not a painted-
in-stripes donkey. (This is, aft er all, just how it would look if it were 
a painted donkey, so by CORNEA its looking that way cannot (dy-
namically) render me justifi ed in believing it’s not one.). But it is also 
true that (T2) if, on my evidence I am justifi ed in believing that it is 
a zebra in the case, I am also, on this evidence, justifi ed in believing 
it is not a painted-in-stripes donkey in the cage. (For I see that the 
fi rst believed proposition entails the second, and on my evidence I 
am justifi ed in believing the fi rst, so by Closure I am also justifi ed 
in believing the second.
Here again, as in the Phat Vat case, the apparent confl ict between CORNEA 
and Closure has evaporated. Indeed, using the two principles in tandem 
allows us to identify the conditions under which both truths can hold. Sup-
pose I do, by observing the cage, become fully justifi ed in believing that a 
zebra is in the cage—so that , by Closure, I am also (seeing the obvious 
entailment) justifi ed in believing that (~PID) it is not a painted-in-stripes 
donkey in the cage. CORNEA says that I cannot, by new input E, have 
become justifi ed in believing ~PID. Accordingly, this proposition must be 
something that it was justifi ed for me to believe before, or independently of, 
the new input E.
Let TE be your total evidence, consisting both of the evidence T that 
you have apart from looking in the cage, and your new evidence E of 
what you see on looking in the cage. CORNEA says that E has no boosting 
power with respect to ~PID, so that if you are now justifi ed in believing 
~PID, it is by virtue of what was available to you before input E—on, in 
other words, your background evidence T.22
Does this Carnapian solution fi t our common sense intuitions? I
venture that for painted donkeys, it does. So far as I can see, our back-
ground evidence gives us no reason to think that there has ever been, in 
the entire history of the universe, a painted donkey substituted for a zebra 
in a real zoo. If this is so, the new visual data of seeing a striped equine in 
the zebra cage may be needed to rule out the possibility that the zebra is 
convalescing at the animal hospital, or out for breeding; it won’t need to 
rule out there being a painted donkey in the cage.23 That hypothesis is a 
non-starter before you’ve bought your ticket.
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7. Escaping the Phat Vat
Does this line of analysis also work for Phat Vat cases? The diﬃ  culty 
here, as Stewart Cohen notes, is that the “global” character of a Phat Vat 
hypothesis seems to absorb in advance any possible evidence against it.24 
How then it be antecedently improbable on one’s total evidence?
Here I think it helps to fi ll in the BIV scenario so as to make the BIV 
possibility less mind-numbingly improbable. Suppose, in the scenario 
sketched earlier, that you are Neo, of Matrix fame, acclaimed as “The 
One” by your fawning band of grungy rebels. And suppose that the rea-
son you’ve stayed up so late is that your total evidence, T, includes recent-
ly-acquired compelling evidence that the Matrix has been capturing your 
rebel comrades one by one, de-bodying them and envatt ing their brains, 
and wiring the brains in phat vats so to give them a perfectly simulated 
virtual rebel life. (Your evidence consists of having recently found the vats, 
with the lifeless debrained corpses of your friends nearby, and of having 
entered—using your Neotic powers—into their new virtual worlds, so as 
to see what their current virtual realities are.) It is this total evidence that 
has kept you up late, brooding about the very real possibility that you 
yourself have now been captured and similarly envatt ed.25 Indeed, given 
the apparent rate of disappearance of your friends, you correctly gauged 
this as having at least a probability of .01. It is about this that you are 
again brooding as you now (E) hear the familiar sound of what you hope 
is your 6:00 a.m. alarm clock going oﬀ , and form the belief (R) that you are 
hearing your real alarm clock ringing.
Properly Carnapped, Closure and CORNEA tell a coherent story here. 
CORNEA dictates that your new experiential input does not and cannot 
“dynamically” justify you in believing ~BIV: you cannot, by E, become justi-
fi ed in believing ~BIV. Hence, if, on your disturbing prior evidence T, it is 
unjustifi ed for you to believe ~BIV before hearing the ringing, then it also 
unjustifi ed for you to believe this aft er hearing the ringing. Now, if hearing 
the ringing sound suﬃ  ciently increases your justifi edness in believing R, to 
the point of your becoming justifi ed (on your total evidence) in believing 
this, then Closure dictates that you are, on your total evidence, also justi-
fi ed in believing ~BIV. But Closure does not say what makes you justifi ed 
in believing this latt er claim: it doesn’t say, most crucially, that your new 
ringing-sound evidence plays any dynamic evidential role here. Closure 
thus leaves open the possibility that the the ringing-sound dynamically 
makes you justifi ed in believing R only if you were, on T alone, already justi-
fi ed in believing ~BIV. This possibility satisfi es both CORNEA and Closure.
But how could T “improbabilize” an all-absorbing global Phat Vat
hypothesis, so as to make it a non-starter? This must remain the big ques-
tion, but here I fi nd our amplifi ed Neo tale at least suggestive. It suggests 
that we can imagine possible worlds, not so very unlike our own, in which 
we have, to degrees that we can imaginatively vary up or down at will, 
much more empirical evidence than we now have that there exist superior 
beings (envatt ers) doing brain-in-vat enslavements of humans. We can 
similarly imagine worlds where we have less evidence for this than we 
now have (worlds where, for example, we lack our current knowledge 
about technology producing sensations by electrical stimulation of the 
CORNEA, CARNAP, AND CURRENT CLOSURE BEFUDDLEMENT 95
cortex, or about the billions of galaxies around us). Since our actual world 
is on this evidential continuum, we are not in an evidential vacuum about 
the general hypothesis that there are envatt ers, and our actual evidence 
surely tilts very strongly against this general hypothesis. And the Phat 
Vat hypothesis, due to its highly specifi c character, may occupy such a 
small possible-world space within this general hypothesis, as to give it, 
relative to the general hypothesis, an infi nitesimally small logical prob-
ability. These are, of course, hard matt ers to discern clearly: how empirical 
and logical probabilities interact is obscure terrain, and here we perhaps 
just do not know our way about. But I do not see that the global character 
of a phat-vat hypothesis precludes that our total evidence justifi es us in
believing we are not in a phat vat. Nor does CORNEA preclude this, since 
it addresses only dynamic support from situational new evidential input, 
not static support on total evidence.
8. Graham and Maitzen’s Argument
My aim here has been to use the Carnapian Distinction to reduce Closure 
befuddlement, allowing Closure to harmonize with CORNEA. I now turn 
to specifi cs in Graham and Maitzen’s argument. I see two main missteps 
here. First, aft er quoting the 1984 oﬃ  cial formulation of CORNEA (see
section 1 above), the authors say: “Wykstra oﬀ ers CORNEA as a necessary 
condition for being “entitled to assert claims of the form it appears that p.” 
But this isn’t right. In the oﬃ  cial formulation, the “only if” clause within 
CORNEA is posited as necessary condition for being entitled to an appears-
claim on the basis of some specifi ed input from a cognized situation. This 
basis-relation is to be understood in the dynamic sense of “supports” to 
which, in the sections preceding the oﬃ  cial formulation, I gave much att en-
tion. The authors are for this reason mistaken in claiming that one cannot, 
given CORNEA, be entitled to assert “It appears that I’m not a brain in the 
Phat Vat” when in the situation described above. CORNEA entails only 
that I cannot become entitled to assert this, on the basis of the new evidential 
input of the situation.
This connects closely to a second mistake. The authors note that in their 
complex Phat Vat case, the CORNEA condition is satisfi ed for a conjunction 
but not for one of its conjuncts: this is correct even in simpler cases, as we 
have seen (see note 14). But they take this as a reductio, posing a question 
meant as rhetorical:
[H]ow could you satisfy CORNEA for asserting a conjunction even 
when one of its conjuncts does not—indeed, cannot—epistemically 
appear to you to be true? This result is bad enough by itself, especially 
in light of the evidential sense of “appears” that Wykstra invokes: 
how could your total evidence support a conjunction while failing to 
support one of its conjuncts? How could you be evidentially bett er-oﬀ  
with respect to (p & q) than you are with respect to p?
But the CORNEA requirement is for dynamic epistemic operators only. 
In cases where q fails the CORNEA test though p&q passes, CORNEA 
doesn’t at all entail that (italics mine) “your total evidence fails to support q 
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(though it supports p&q),” nor that you are “overall bett er oﬀ  with respect 
to p&q than with respect to q.” It entails only that your new evidential input 
cannot dynamically boost q, (though it may dynamically boost p&q): your 
new situational input cannot “boost” you into being epistemically bett er 
oﬀ  than you were before with respect to q (though it may do so for p&q). And 
the Carnapian Distinction has allowed us to see that this does not violate 
Closure, once this is duly restricted to static epistemic operators.
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